Seaweeds and Lighthouse

Bolinao, Pangasinan

Xiamen University

Fujian, China

Pandas

River Safari, Singapore

Friday, February 20, 2015

Arcelona v. Farancio

Facts
Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U.S.A.
Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Peaches Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (Olanday, et al) — pets are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents.  The six Arcelonas are named as co-owners over the fishpond.
A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of 3 years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984. 
Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al.
Farnacio filed a civil case for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., (exluding the Arcelonas in US) before RTC. The case was intended to maintain Farancio as tenant of the fishpond. 
lower courts
RTC: Recognized Farnacio as tenant-caretaker over the fishpond at Lomboy District, Dagupan City; Ordered the defendants to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation of said fishpond
CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
SC sustained the CA decision. After remand of the case, resp was placed in possession of the property.
Pets then filed with CA a petition for annulment of the judgment against Farancio and the sheriff.  CA directed pets "to implead as defendant the RTC."  CA promulgated the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Dissatisfied, Olandays lodged this petition for review.
Ruling
What are the remedies and the grounds to invalidate a final and executory judgment?
There are really three ways by which a final judgment may be attacked: 
1.        Petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 (old rules), when judgment has been taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence (petition must be filed within 60 days after the pet learns of the judgment, but not more than 6 months after judgment was entered.
2.        Direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. This remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment.
3.        Either a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the challenged judgment (which is) void upon its face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. Justice Malcolm in his dissent in Banco Español-Filipino v. Peaches Palanca,  "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists."
CC No. Q-5866 is not void upon its face, it may only be annulled by direct action on the ground of fraud.
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy."
Extrinsic fraud is the ground to annul a voidable final judgment.
Declaration of nullity of a patently void final judgment is based on grounds other than extrinsic fraud.
Are all the co-owners pro indiviso of a real property indispensable parties?  Does the non-inclusion of some of such co-owners in a suit involving tenancy over said property constitute sufficient ground to nullify the final decision rendered in such case?
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 
Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated vs. CA
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Art 487 of the OCC "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." A co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. Chief Justice Moran:
were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him.  
A tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land. Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded
CC D-7240 cannot bind pets and cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro-indiviso. The failure to implead pets barred the lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality. 
The want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not patent on the face of said judgment.  
The responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably rested on him.
Even pets had authorized Olanday, et al. to enter into a lease contract, this fact did not authorize the latter to represent pets in the civil case he brought.
The nullity of a judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence found in the records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.
May extraneous matters, not found in the records of the original case, be used to void such final judgment? NO!
The nullity of the judgment due to lack of jurisdiction may be proved at most by the evidence on record but never by extraneous evidence.  
The doctrine that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the record alone, thereby excluding extraneous proof seems to be the natural unavoidable result of that stamp of authenticity which, from the earliest times, was placed upon the "record," and which gave it such "uncontrollable credit and verity that no plea, proof, or averment could be heard to the contrary."
An action for annulment of judgment is grounded on extrinsic fraud, extraneous evidence is admitted.  
The finding of estoppel and laches by CA is not supported by the evidence on record. The silence of pets can easily be explained by the fact that they were not in the country during the pendency of the subject civil case.  
Alabang Development Corporation vs. Valenzuela: no laches attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction:
Estoppel is a principle that, as a rule, can be invoked only in highly exceptional and legitimate cases. 
 (a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question;
(b) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and
(c) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Pets' receipt of lease rentals cannot be used as proof of recognition of private resp as a caretaker-tenant.  
Intervention as a Remedy of Pets
Procedurally, may an independent action for annulment of a decision filed in the CA prosper in the face of a claim that the remedy of intervention could have been availed of in the RTC during the original proceedings?
Jurisprudence upholds the soundness of an independent action to declare as null and void a judgment rendered without jurisdiction as in this case. Leonor Peaches vs. CA:

A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." 

Wee v. De Castro [2008]




nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
action
Action for ejectment instituted by George de Castro, on his own behalf and on behalf of Annie de Castro, Felomina de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro.  
FACTS
De Castro alleged that they are the registered owners of the two-storey building. (P9K per month). Both parties agreed that effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be increased from P9K to P15K.  Wee failed to pay the increase on rent.
The rental dispute was brought to the Barangay. Since they failed to reach an amicable settlement, a Certificate was issued. George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-owners, Annie de Castro, Felomina Peaches de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
Although the Complaint stated that it was being filed by all of the resps:
·          Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by George de Castro alone.
·          He subsequently attached the SPAs executed by his sisters Annie and Felomina  
wee’s defenses
·          no agreement between the parties to increase the rents demand for an increase was exorbitant
·          Resps failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of conciliation before the Barangay Lupon prior to the filing before the courts
·          MTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since resps' Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful withholding" of the subject property by the pet.
lower courts
MTC dismissed the case for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the Barangay Lupon.  
RTC affirmed the dismissal. Since no concession was reached by the parties to increase such amount to P15K, pet cannot be faulted for paying only the originally agreed upon monthly rentals.
Resps' failure to refer the matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process barred the ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a condition sine qua non in the filing of ejectment suits.
The allegation in the Complaint was flawed, since resps failed to allege that there was an "unlawful withholding"  taking out from the purview of an action for unlawful detainer.
Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a co-owner could not maintain an action without joining all the other co-owners.
CA denied the MR interposed by pet for lack of merit.
issues/ruling
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession:
·          forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
·          recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
·          recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).

Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman: a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus: All co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to NCC 487, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
there’s spa anyway
Annie and Felomina each executed a SPA, giving George the authority to initiate the case.
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal.
authority to sign the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
Mendoza v. Coronel: The execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. 
Failure by George to attach the SPAs is innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was granted by his sisters the authority to file the action for ejectment against pet prior to the institution of the case. 
Torres Peaches v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation: the personal signing of the verification requirement was deemed substantially complied with when 2/ 25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification attached to it.
WON failure to allege “unlawful withoulding” is fatal to the cause of action
NO, what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of his right to possess. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant,, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
Barba v. CA: although the phrase "unlawfully withholding" was not actually used in her complaint, the Court held that her allegations amounted to an unlawful withholding of the subject property by therein private resps, because they continuously refused to vacate the premises even after notice and demand.
failure of the counsel to attach official receipt of his ibp dues
Moot and academic, since resps' counsel has already duly complied therewith.  
BARANGAY JUSTICE SYSTEM
Pet: Certification to file action issued by the Barangay Lupon appended to the resps' Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of ejectment.
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. The barangay courts is essentially a compulsory arbitration in character. To ensure this objective, Section 6 of PD 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process as a precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions.  PD No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code), which took effect on 1 January 1992.
While it is true that the Certification refers only to rental increase and not to the ejectment of pet from the subject property, the submission of the same for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof.
The contract of lease between the parties did not stipulate a fixed period. Hence, the parties agreed to the payment of rentals on a monthly basis. On this score, NCC 1687[1]
The period of such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month.  Without a lease contract, pet has no right of possession to the subject property and must vacate the same.  
Lessor's right to rescind the contract of lease for non-payment of the demanded increased rental was recognized by this Court in Chua v. Victorio::
Payment of the rent is one of a lessee's statutory obligations, and, upon non-payment by pets of the increased rental in Sept 1994, the lessor acquired the right to avail of any of the three remedies outlined above. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pet is liable for the payment of back rentals, attorney's fees and cost of the suit. Resps must be duly indemnified for the loss of income from the subject property on account of pet's refusal to vacate the leased premises.
CA AFFIRMED in toto.



[1] Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. 

Flores v. Mallare-Philipps

nature
Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.
FACTS
Flores sued the resps for the collection of sum of money with the RTC
The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.
Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE
WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties 
ruling
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948  
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
comparison of former and present rules

Present Rules
Former Rules
Where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action
Totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the COA arose out of the same or diff transactions. If the total demand exceeds P20K – RTC has jurisdiction

If the causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is 20K or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or MTC.
Totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the COA arose out of the same or diff transactions. If the total demand exceeds P20K – RTC has jurisdiction

If the causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is 20K or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or MTC.
Two or more plaintiffs having a separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint
Where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test
The former rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant.
The causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.


Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The several claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.  

The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
·          Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
·          International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.