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Bolinao, Pangasinan

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Fujian, China

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River Safari, Singapore

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Virginia Ocampo Juarez v. CA, Cetus Development Corporation [1992]

·          Lot at 502 Quezon Boulevard, Manila was leased in the early 1900's to Servillano Ocampo, who built a house thereon where he lived with his parents and his sister Angela. He died on March 17, 1956. The lease was taken over by Angela Ocampo, who continued to stay in the house together with her children, including petitioner Virginia Ocampo Juarez.
·          In 1976, because of her age, Angela moved to Virginia's house in Pasay City. The house on Quezon Boulevard she leased to Roberto Capuchino, reserving only one room for her personal belongings.
·          Meantime, the lot had been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty, Inc., which in turn sold it in 1985 to Cetus Development Corporation.
·          Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment on the ground that the lessee had subleased the property without its consent in violation of BP 877.
·          Trial Court: BP 877 inapplicable because the sublease was made prior to its effectivity.
·          RTC: Affirmed.
·          CA reversed.  BP 877 applicable. Original contract of lease did not specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a monthly basis. The contract was deemed terminated from month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on June 12, 1985.
Issue: WON the application of BP 877 which requires the petitioner to seek a written consent from the owner is a violation of the impairment clause and prohibition against ex post facto laws. NO.
Ratio
·          NCC 1687: If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily...
·          When the sublease was renewed in July 1985, it had become invalid under BP 877. The law was operating prospectively upon the renewed contract.
·          The impairment clause is no longer inviolate; there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general.
·          The interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power… As long as the contract affects the public welfare so as to require the interference of the State, then police power must prevail over the impairment clause.
·          In Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Philippine Veterans Bank: …The clause, according to Corwin, "is lately of negligible importance, and might well be stricken from the Constitution. For most practical purposes, in fact, it has been"…  The impact of the modern society has left the clause in a shambles, as it were, making practically every contract susceptible to change on behalf of the public. The contract may be altered validly if it involves the public interest, to which private interests must yield "as a postulate of the existing social order."
·          Housing is a serious social problem of the country. The regulation of rentals, has long been the continuing concern of the government.The laws intends prevent the lessor from imposing arbitrary conditions on the lessee while at the same time deterring the lessee from abusing the statutory benefits accorded to him.
·          The contention that BP 877 is an ex post facto law must also be rejected. It is not penal in nature. She is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions. She was sued in the municipal court in a civil complaint to eject her from the lot on the ground that she had unlawfully subleased it.

Sunday, September 15, 2013

Dean Marita Reyes and UP Medicine Faculty v. CA, UP Board of Regents

Facts:
·          Parties to this case are students to the UP Medicine obtained scores higher than 70% in the NMAT which was the cutoff score by the UPCM Faculty in 1986 which was approved by the University Council. However, their scores were lower than the 90% cut-off score for 1987.
·          At the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S approval.
·          The students filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
·          UPCM’s petition in SC was dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed three years in the college.
·          On 1990, the students, burdened with "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the College" wrote a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested:
o    they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements;
o    that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case;
o    that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college
·          The RTC dismissed the case. However, the UPCM Faculty denied the appeal of the students because they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM.
·          As a result, the students filed with the RTC a MR its order of dismissal. The RTC ordered the admission of the students.
·          The BOR (1031st meeting) resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them
·          UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. The UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct and  issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension against the Dean and Secretary.
Issue: WON the Med Faculty can enforce the cut-off that they set without the approval of University Council. NO.
Ratio:
·          The powers vested in the ff
o    BOR:  governance and the general powers of administration of the university [UP Charter (Act No. 1870)]
o    University Council: the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university (sec. 9). [UP Charter (Act No. 1870)]
o    College Faculty:  the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the approval of the autonomous UC. [University Code, Title II, Chapter 43, Article 324]
·          Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UC's approval.
·          The fact that the students knew of the 90 percentile NMAT cut-off score would not cure this defect. It follows then that the previously approved NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile remains the prescribed passing grade.
·          When the BOR retained the cut off score it did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to the UPCM.
·          The UPCM cannot invoke that it was given the authority to decide by the UC. What was actually approved in said meeting of the College of Medicine Faculty are: "NMAT has replaced CMET" and "It was moved by Dr. Talusan and seconded by Dr. Reodica that 70% be the cut off point of NMAT for all categories. The motion was carried without any objection.
·          The clause "as prescribed by the College of Medicine faculty" cannot be interpreted as a delegation of authority to prescribe the written test(s) of achievement without the approval of the University Council. The clause is worded in the past tense and can only refer to an accomplished act of the faculty.
·          Petitioners also invoke that the students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to admission based on the letter that they sent
·          SC: The student's aforesaid feeling does not amount to a categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Its predicated more on an overwhelming sense of hopelessness because of the antagonistic treatment of the faculty towards the students.

·          The faculty cannot invoke academic freedom because the under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the University Council.

Isabelo v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal and DECS [1993]


Facts:
·          A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of mandamus addressed to DECS to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior graduating student of Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR)
·          Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal for BS Criminology. He was elected Public Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council
·          He was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. He was asked by the VP for Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992.
·          Manuelito refused to sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers.
·          Since, the administration assured that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105.
·          PHCR announced that it will increase tuition fees in all levels. The student council filed with the DECS a motion for reconsideration. DECS held the advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending the resolution of (the) matter."
·          The administration dropped Manuelito from PHCR's list of students because of the following reasons:
o    Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
o    No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;
o    Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
o    Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22)
·          He took special training during the semestral break, and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still refused to give him that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.
·          Manuelito wrote to DECS, which in turn sent their letter to PHCR ordering that students should be allowed to continue their classes pending the resolution. PHCR did not comply with the directive.
·          Manuelito: Real reason PHCR has voided his enrollment is his active participation in opposing PHCR's application for tuition fee increase with the DECS.
·          PHCR: invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. HE been allowed to enroll "conditionally" pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.
Issue: WON PHCR may drop Manuelito from the list of students. CASE REMANDED.
·          In Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology: admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student.
·          In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulon: the term "academic freedom" "the freedom to determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to study."  
·          However academic freedom is not an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.
·          In Non vs. Dames II: abandoned Alcuaz vs. PSBA, (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead the right of a student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. We have also stressed that the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.
·          Expulsion is disproportionate to his deficiencies in his CMT course. The circumstances show that the PHCR has strongly been influenced by his participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase.

·          However DECS should determine whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class or has a number of school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent school counters.