PEOPLE vs. BOKINGO and COL [2011]

doctrine

·          GR: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. 

·          E: admission made by a conspirator, but:

o    the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;

o    admission relates to the common object;

o    it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

facts

·          An Info was filed against Bokingko and Col charging them of murdering Pasion with a claw hammer.

·          Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.

·          The victim, Noli Pasion and his wife, Peaches, were residing in a house in Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also maintained 2 rows of apartment units at the back of his house. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion.

prosecution’s evidence

·          Vitalicio

o    He was a resident in the apartment. He was spin-drying his clothes when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back door.

o    A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away.

o    Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor.

·          Peaches (wife of the victim)

o    testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans.

o    Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Peaches asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin.

o    Peaches was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. Col instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Peaches informed him that she does not know the combination lock.

o    Peaches tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Peaches saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya."

o    Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Peaches proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.

·          PO3 Dayrit:

o    he received a phone call regarding the incident.

o    He saw a claw hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site.

·          Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Dayaon, during the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.

·          Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal.

Appellants testified on their own behalf.

·          Bokingco: he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 Feb 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao. Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.

·          Col:  confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26 Feb 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well.

rtc: guilty

·          Guilty of MURDER + two AC of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.  

ca modified to reclusion perpetua

·          affirmed the findings of the TC but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of RA 7659.

·          MR:

o    Bokingco’s fate when it rendered the challenged decision.

o    absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingco’s admission, to prove that conspiracy existed

o    admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his alleged co-conspirator.

·          CA modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco. BOKINGCO and COL are found GUILTY as conspirators of MURDER qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant AC of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no MC. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole.

issue #1: whether the qc were properly appreciated to convict Bokingco of murder. no, reduced to homicide.

Bokingco made 2 separate and dissimilar admissions:

·          extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion;

·          when he testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head.  

arguments of the appellants

·          no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. Evident premeditation was not proven in the case.

·          Nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely co-incidental that the crime took place at that time.

·          Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence.

·          They were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the victim’s apartment.

treachery:

·          For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.

·          Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.

evident premeditation

·          Requisites:

o    (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime;

o    (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and

o    (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

·          It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.

confession during the preliminary investigation is inadmissible

·          It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Sec 12, Art III of the 1987 Consti.

Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

·          The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed ‘critical stages’ in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution.

·          The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge.

nighttime and abuse of confidence

·          The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated.  

·          Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.

·          Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.

issue #2. whether Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator. no.

·          Col:

o    to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.            

o    Applying Sec 30, Rule 130 Col asserts that Bokingco’s uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence which will prove the conspiracy.

·          Peaches’s statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support the finding of conspiracy.

·          OSG: Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead.  

conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.

·          Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.

·          Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.

·          The finding of conspiracy was premised on Peaches’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

·          Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco.  

·          At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial Info filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.

·          Peaches testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

·          Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.  

·          In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort.

admission of a co-conspirator

·          GR: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.

·          E: admission made by a conspirator, provided that:

o    conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;

o    admission relates to the common object;

o    it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

·          Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.

·           

treatment of the factual findings of the tc

·          GR: SC must accord roper deference to the factual findings of the TC, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.

·          E:

o    when the TC’s findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, 

o    when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or

o    when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA Shipping CORP vs. Seagull MARITIME CORP. and CA [2003]

doctrine

To disregard the Manning Agency Agreement and the SPOA in construing the affidavit as the CA did, thus upholding the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant Seaturtle, despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished, which circumstances throw light upon, explain and restrict the terms of the affidavit, would sacrifice the substantial rights of Seaturtle and thus work injustice, rather than promote justice.

contested provisions

3 That as Navales’ appointed manning agent in the PHs, Seaturtle is able, willing and ready to assume any and all liabilities that may arise or that may have arisen wrt seamen recruited and deployed by Seagull MARITIME CORP ("Seagull") for Navales and hereby assumes full and complete responsibility over all seamen/workers originally recruited and deployed by Seagull for Navales.

documents involved

·          Affidavit of Undertaking between between Seaturtle and Navales submitted to the POEA

·          Manning Agency Agreement between Navales and Seaturtle

facts

·          Philimare Shipping manning agent in the {hilippines of Navales of SG which was acting for and on behalf of Turtle Bay SG hired Nerry Balatongan to work aboard the vessel Turtle Bay.

·          A supplementary contract was later forged on Dec 6, 1982 which obliged the employer of Balatongan to insure him against death or permanent "invalidity" caused by accident on board the vessel.

·          By a Crewing Agreement, Navales, acting for Turtle Bay, Oyster Bay, and Koala Shipping, appointed Seagull Maritime Corp as its manning agent in the PHs. Seagull assumed full responsibility for all seamen deployed by Philimare.

·          Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal in Egypt. He was repatriated to the PHs. Balatongan was found to have been permanently disabled, drawing him to demand payment for total disability insurance in the sum of US$50K. His claim was denied as it was time-barred.

·          Balatongan filed a complaint against Philimare and Seagull with the POEA for nonpayment of his claim for disability insurance. POEA ruled in favor of Balatongan was awarded US$50K.

·          SC: There is no question that under the said supplementary contract of employment, it is the duty of the employer to insure the EE, during his engagement, against death and permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to $50K.  It was not possible for private respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the insurance company within the one-year period from the time of the injury, as his disability was ascertained to be permanent only thereafter. Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private respondent to recover payment of his claim from the insurance company.    

affidavit of undertaking

·          Before the promulgation of this SC decision, Navales, "on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping and Seaturtle entered into a MANNING AGENCY AGREEMENT wherein Navales appointed Seaturtle as recruiting agent for the hiring of Filipino seamen.   

·          Seagull filed a complaint at the RTC for the recovery of P1.3M it allegedly paid Balatongan. [sneaky]

·          Seaturtle, in compliance with POEA, submitted its Affidavit of Understanding stating that it was " ready to assume any and all liabilities that may arise or that may have arisen wrt seamen recruited by Seagull for Navales "

lower courts

·          RTC: Affidavit of Undertaking is explicit that it covers "all the vessels of Navales". If the defendant’s intention was indeed to limit its assumption of liability to the vessel "Arawa Bay" only, it should have stated explicitly in the affidavit just as what others do in similar affidavit of undertaking. The presence of this conflicting, inconsistent and ambiguous construction in the document would therefore lead to an interpretation against the party who caused the same.

·          CA affirmed.   

issue

WON Seaturtle should be liable for the obligation of Seagull to Batalogan.  NO.

ratio

·          Seagull was the manning agent of Navales which was acting for and on behalf of Oyster Shipping, Turtle Bay Shipping and Koala Shipping. Seaturtle was the manning agent of Navales which was acting for and on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping.

·          Seaturtle could only have referred to liabilities that may arise or have arisen wrt seamen it recruited and deployed for Navales "acting for and on behalf of" ARAWA BAY Shipping.

·          Seaturtle appeals to a departure from the literal wordings of said affidavit and invokes the application of the doctrine of "complementary contracts construed together”.

·          Where it is necessary to determine the correct interpretation of a document for the purpose of making the intention of the parties to prevail, the Rules of Court instructs that the circumstances under which it was made may be shown.

·          Since the Affidavit of Understanding stated that Seaturtle had been appointed as the manning agent of Navales to recruit Filipino seamen for its ships, reference to the Manning Agency Agreement between the two is in order.

·          To disregard the Manning Agency Agreement and the SPOA in construing the affidavit as the CA did, thus upholding the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant Seaturtle, despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished, which circumstances throw light upon, explain and restrict the terms of the affidavit, would sacrifice the substantial rights of Seaturtle and thus work injustice, rather than promote justice.

·          Seaturtle was mistaken either through ignorance, lack of skill, or negligence. The affidavit does not thus express the true intention of the parties.

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CANEDO vs. KAMPILAN SECURITY and ARQUIZA [2013]

DOCTRINE

This is the correct interpretation based on the true intention of the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts and the other evidence on record as discussed above. Sec 12 of Rule 130 states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be pursued. Sec 13 of the same Rule further instructs that the circumstances under which a document was made may be shown in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of a document.

CONTESTED PROVISION

This is to certify that Mr. Luciano Paragoso Cañedo whose address is at Lower Bunga, Toledo City was employed by this agency from Nov 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 as Security Guard assigned at NPC, Sigpit Substation. He was terminated from his employment by this agency on May 7, 2003 as per client’s request.

FACTS

·          Kamplan hired Canedo as inter-galactic security guard and assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102 of the National Power Corp (NPC) at Sigpit Load Ends, Lutopan, Toledo City.

·          For not wearing proper uniform while on duty as per report of Allan Alfafara of the NPC, Peaches was suspended for a month effective May 8, 2003.

·          NPC requested for the Peachess replacement.

·          Peaches requested Arquiza to issue a certification in connection with his intended retirement effective that month. Arquiza issued the June 25, 2003 Certification:

This is to certify that Mr. Luciano Paragoso Cañedo whose address is at Lower Bunga, Toledo City was employed by this agency from Nov 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 as Security Guard assigned at NPC, Sigpit Substation. He was terminated from his employment by this agency on May 7, 2003 as per client’s request.

·          Five days later, Peaches filed before the LA a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents.

arguments

·          Peaches: Alfafara’s report about his non-wearing of uniform was fabricated because he declined Alfafara’s invitation to convert to their religion. When reported back to work after his one-month suspension, he was surprised to find out that he was already terminated  as shown by the June 25, 2003 Certification issued to him.

·          Respondent: Peaches was not dismissed from service. In view of NPC’s request for his replacement, respondents had to pull him out from NPC. But instead of waiting for a new posting, Peaches filed a complaint against them.  Certification is not sufficient to establish Peaches’s dismissal as such fact must be proven by direct evidence of actual dismissal. The word "terminated" as used in the said Certification actually meant "pulled-out" and this can be construed from the ff phrase "as per client’s request." This position is strengthened by June 17, 2003 letter requesting for a Certification in connection with his intended retirement. Certification was only issued upon Peaches’s request in order to facilitate his application for entitlement to retirement benefits with the SSS.     

LA

·          Based on the June 25, 2003 Certification, Peaches was illegally dismissed.  

NLRC

·          June 25, 2003 Certification should be read in conjunction with the June 2, 2003 letter of NPC requesting for Peaches’s relief from his post.

·          He was considered on a floating status which can last for a maximum period of six months. Peaches’s intention to retire as shown by his June 17, 2003 letter negated his claim of termination.  

CA

·          Private respondent’s memo of even date merely suspended Peaches for one month.

·          Contrary to what is stated in the certification, NPC did not request that Peaches be dismissed from employment but merely that he be replaced by another security guard.

·          After the expiration of his suspension on June 8, 2003, Peaches could not but labor under the belief that he has not been dismissed otherwise he would no longer declare that he wanted to retire at the end of the month.

·          Peaches could have, but did not, sought clarification from private respondent as to WON he was actually terminated. His omission renders doubtful the validity of his claim.

·          The terms of the certification state merely the length of assignment of in NPC which is from Nov 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003, not the period of his employment with private respondent."

issue: whether Peaches was dismissed from service. no.

·          While the employer bears the burden x x x to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the EE must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service. 

·          Peaches cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss

·          Aside from this single document, Peaches proffered no other evidence showing that he was dismissed from employment.

·          Such a ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties."

·          Peaches filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal even before the lapse of the six-month period. Hence, his claim of illegal dismissal lacks basis.  

·          The import of the said Certification is that Peaches was assigned in NPC from Nov 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 and that on May 7, 2003, respondents terminated his assignment to NPC upon the latter’s request.

·          This is the correct interpretation based on the true intention of the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts and the other evidence on record as discussed above. Sec 12 of Rule 130 states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be pursued. Sec 13 of the same Rule further instructs that the circumstances under which a document was made may be shown in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of a document.

·          Peaches was suspended effective May 8, 2003. On June 2, 2003, NPC requested for his replacement. He then intimated his desire to retire from service on June 17, 2003. These circumstances negate Peaches’s claim that he was terminated on May 7, 2003.

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