Lorenzo and Socorro Velasco v. CA and Magdalena Estate Inc. [June 29, 1973]

Facts:

· Suit for specific performance filed by Lorenzo Velasco against the Magdalena Estate, Inc.

Plaintiff’s Version

· On Nov 29, 1962 the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a CONTRACT OF SALE of land (2,059 sq m) at for P100,000.00.

· Payment terms:

o down payment: P10,000.00 and P20,000.00

o P70,000.00 would be paid in installments

o equal monthly amortization will be determined as soon as the P30,000.00 DP had been completed.

· Plaintiff paid P10,000.00 on November 29, 1962 (Exh. "A")

· On Jan 8, 1964 he tendered the payment of P20,000.00 but the defendant refused to accept and refused to execute a formal deed of sale.

· Socorro Velasco is his sister-in-law and that he had requested her to make the necessary contacts referring to the purchase of the property because he does not understand English well.

· The receipt states: "Earnest money for the purchase of Lot 15, Block 7, Psd-6129, Area 2,059 square meters including improvements thereon — P10,000.00." At the bottom of Exhibit A the following appears: "Agreed price: P100,000.00, P30,000.00 down payment, bal. in 10 years."

Defendant:

· No contract of sale was perfected because the minds of the parties did not meet "in regard to the manner of payment.”

· Contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

· the property was leased by Socorro Velasco and that the defendant indicated its willingness to sell the property for P100,000.00:

o P30,000.00

o P20,000.00 of which was to be paid on November 31, 1962,

o P70,000.00 including interest a 9% per annum was to be paid on installments for a period of ten years at the rate of P5,381.32 on June 30 and December of every year until the same shall have been fully paid;

· On November 29, 1962 Socorro Velasco offered to pay P10,000.00 as initial payment instead of the agreed P20,000.00 but because the amount was short of the alleged P20,000.00 the same was accepted merely as deposited and upon request of Socorro Velasco the receipt was made in the name of her brother-in-law the plaintiff herein;

· Socorro Velasco failed to complete the down payment of P30,000.00 and neither has she paid any installments on the balance of P70,000.00 up to the present time;

· On January 8, 1964 that Socorro Velasco tendered payment of P20,000.00, which offer the defendant refused to accept because it had considered the offer to sell rescinded on account of her failure to complete the down payment on or before December 31, 1962.

Issue: Whether the talks between the Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Lorenzo Velasco ever ripened into a consummated sale? NO.

Ratio:

· The material averments contained in the petitioners' complaint disclose a lack of complete "agreement in regard to the manner of payment" of the lot in question. The complaint states pertinently:

o 4. That plaintiff and defendant further agreed that the total down payment shall by P30,000.00, including the P10,000.00 partial payment mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof, and that upon completion of the said down payment of P30,000.00, the balance of P70,000.00 shall be said by the plaintiff to the defendant in 10 years from November 29, 1962;

o 5. That the time within the full down payment of the P30,000.00 was to be completed was not specified by the parties but the defendant was duly compensated during the said time prior to completion of the down payment of P30,000.00 by way of lease rentals on the house existing thereon which was earlier leased by defendant to the plaintiff's sister-in-law, Socorro J. Velasco, and which were duly paid to the defendant by checks drawn by plaintiff.

· Petitioners admit that they still had to meet and agree on how and when the down-payment and the installment payments were to be paid.

· Such being the situation, it cannot be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question.

· Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.



· The fact that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum of P10,000 cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under article 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter — the terms of payment — still had to be mutually covenanted.

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Buaya v. RTC Judge Polo and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation [Jan 26, 1989]

Nature: instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by RTC Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds

o    (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and

o    (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.

Facts:

·         Solemnidad M. Buaya was an insurance agent who was authorized to transact and collect the premiums for CBIC.

·         Buaya is required to account and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila.

·         An audit showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72.

·         She was charged with estafa before the RTC-Manila.

·         She filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by respondent Judge. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.

·         Buaya:

o    Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

o    Subject matter is purely civil in nature because the fact that CBIC separately filed a civil case involving the same alleged misappropriated amount.

·         CBIC:

o    Denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

o    Procedure to be followed is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC)

Issue/Held:

1. WON denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered?

·         As a general rule, YES, but there are exceptions because it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.

2. WON the Manila RTC has jurisdiction?

Allegations of complaint as basis

·         YES. Jurisdiction of court is based on the COMPLAINT.

·         Averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People).

·         The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

Essential Elements of a crime

·         Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court:

o    In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.

·         Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The failure to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Dispositive: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Remanded to RTC.

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Jimenez v. RTC Judge Sorongon and Socrates Antzoulatos, et. al. [Dec 5, 2012]

Nature: petition for review on certiorari to challenge the twin resolutions of the CA which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration

Facts:

·         Jimenez is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency.

·         Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), a local manning agency.

·         On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).

·         On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.

·         In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.

·         Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively.

·         In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.

·         On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a September 2, 2005 order, the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.

·         On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.

·         On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.

·         In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.

·         On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.

·         In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge.

·         The case was re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Sorongon.

The RTC Rulings

·         In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found:

(1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and

(2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.

·         On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.

·         On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.

·         In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s MR, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.

·         On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.

·         On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.

·         On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.²⁷

·         In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.

·         On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.

The CA Ruling

·         In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General  has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.

·         Petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business.

·         Denied the MR that followed.

The Petition

·         Petitioner:

o    He has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts;

o    Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.

The Case for the Respondents

·         Respondents:

o    Petitioner lacks a legal standing since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor;

o    Petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.

Issues:

1.     Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines? NO. Petitioner has no legal standing. In a criminal case, the real party in interest is the People of the Philippines.

The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case

·         "Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."

·         Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. 

·         By real interest is present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy or a consequential interest.

·         When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.

·         "All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." 

·         In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code)

 SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)

·         The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.

·         EXCEPTION: Offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process).

·         The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents.

2. WON Alamil is a fugitive justice and therefore has no right to seek any relief from the RTC?

·         NO. Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction

·         One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Dispositive: Appeal Denied. CA Affirmed.

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Antiporda et. al v. Justice Garchitorena et. al. (1st Division of Sandiganbayan) [Dec 23, 1999]

Nature: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the 1^st Division Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from enforcing the warrants of arrest or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.

Facts:

·         Municipal Mayor Antiporda and others were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads as follows:

“That on September 1, 1995, in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr…did then and there… kidnap Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle…“

·         Sandiganbaya ordered the prosecution to submit an amendment to the Information:

[Sandiganbayan] expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related.

For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given 30 days to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged...

·         The prosecution filed an Amended Information:

“That on September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as such and taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla… kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos… and detain him illegally at the residence of Antiporda  for more than five (5) days.”

·         Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred. 

·         Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto denied the Omnibus Motion.

·         The accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued which was also denied "on the ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added… so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the Amended Information.

·         Also, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time"

·         The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. 

·         Sandiganbayan ignored the Motion to Quash since the accused have continually refused to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court.

·         A MR was filed wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction over their persons. 

·         Sandiganbayan denied the MR.

Issues:

a) Can the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction as charged in the original complaint, acquire jurisdiction through the amendment of Information? NO, petitioners barred by estoppel.

Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction

·         Sec. 4, par (a) of P.D. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office…

·         Criminal Jurisdiction Requisites:

(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of (SUBJECT MATTER)

(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (VENUE OR TERRITORY)

(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial (PERSON OF THE ACCUSED)

a) forcibly by warrant of arrest

b) or upon his voluntary submission to the court.

PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

·         Petitioners:

o    Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction since the original information did not allege that one of the petitioners, took advantage of his position as mayor.

o    Court lacking jurisdiction cannot order the amendment of the information.

·         Court:

o    They cannot question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan because they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash.  

SUBJECT MATTER

WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged?

·         NO. The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related.

·         BUT, the petitioners are estopped for in the MR filed with the Sandiganbayan, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their MR that the said crime is work connected.

·         A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. 

·         Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

b) Can the amended information be allowed without conducting anew a preliminary investigation for the graver offense charged therein?

·         Reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. It is proper only if the accused's substantial rights would be impaired. The amendments merely describe the public positions and where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.

·         A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and but determines only whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.

·         The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

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People v. Lagon [May 18, 1990]

Nature: Petition for Review filed by the People as represented by the Fiscal arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case.

Facts:

·         Libertad Lagon was charged with estafa under par2(d) RPC 315 in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise.

·         April 1975 - alleged commission of the crime [arresto mayor max to PC min] 

·         Oct 22 1975 – PD 818 was enacted increasing the penalty to PM med

·         July 1976 –criminal information filed at City Court

·         Dec 1976 - City Court dismissed the information because the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose.

·         City Court: at the time of the institution of the action

·         OSG: agreed with the City Court

Issues/Ruling:

1. WON the City Court has jurisdiction. Whether the court jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at a) the time of the institution of the action or at b) the time of the commission of the crime?

·         Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Therefore, the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Petition for review dismissed.

·         Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948: jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense… in which the penalty… does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ."

2. Would application of the doctrine not result in also applying PD 818, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws?

·         RPC 22 permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . "

·         Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.

·         In People v.Purisima and People v. Buissan:

o    . . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint…”. 

·         Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the penalty provided in the law at the time of the commission of the crime.

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Virginia Ocampo Juarez v. CA, Cetus Development Corporation [1992]

·          Lot at 502 Quezon Boulevard, Manila was leased in the early 1900's to Servillano Ocampo, who built a house thereon where he lived with his parents and his sister Angela. He died on March 17, 1956. The lease was taken over by Angela Ocampo, who continued to stay in the house together with her children, including petitioner Virginia Ocampo Juarez.

·          In 1976, because of her age, Angela moved to Virginia's house in Pasay City. The house on Quezon Boulevard she leased to Roberto Capuchino, reserving only one room for her personal belongings.

·          Meantime, the lot had been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty, Inc., which in turn sold it in 1985 to Cetus Development Corporation.

·          Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment on the ground that the lessee had subleased the property without its consent in violation of BP 877.

·          Trial Court: BP 877 inapplicable because the sublease was made prior to its effectivity.

·          RTC: Affirmed.

·          CA reversed.  BP 877 applicable. Original contract of lease did not specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a monthly basis. The contract was deemed terminated from month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on June 12, 1985.

Issue: WON the application of BP 877 which requires the petitioner to seek a written consent from the owner is a violation of the impairment clause and prohibition against ex post facto laws. NO.

Ratio

·          NCC 1687: If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily...

·          When the sublease was renewed in July 1985, it had become invalid under BP 877. The law was operating prospectively upon the renewed contract.

·          The impairment clause is no longer inviolate; there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general.

·          The interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power… As long as the contract affects the public welfare so as to require the interference of the State, then police power must prevail over the impairment clause.

·          In Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Philippine Veterans Bank: …The clause, according to Corwin, "is lately of negligible importance, and might well be stricken from the Constitution. For most practical purposes, in fact, it has been"…  The impact of the modern society has left the clause in a shambles, as it were, making practically every contract susceptible to change on behalf of the public. The contract may be altered validly if it involves the public interest, to which private interests must yield "as a postulate of the existing social order."

·          Housing is a serious social problem of the country. The regulation of rentals, has long been the continuing concern of the government.The laws intends prevent the lessor from imposing arbitrary conditions on the lessee while at the same time deterring the lessee from abusing the statutory benefits accorded to him.

·          The contention that BP 877 is an ex post facto law must also be rejected. It is not penal in nature. She is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions. She was sued in the municipal court in a civil complaint to eject her from the lot on the ground that she had unlawfully subleased it.

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Dean Marita Reyes and UP Medicine Faculty v. CA, UP Board of Regents

Facts:

·          Parties to this case are students to the UP Medicine obtained scores higher than 70% in the NMAT which was the cutoff score by the UPCM Faculty in 1986 which was approved by the University Council. However, their scores were lower than the 90% cut-off score for 1987.

·          At the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S approval.

·          The students filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.

·          UPCM’s petition in SC was dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed three years in the college.

·          On 1990, the students, burdened with "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the College" wrote a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested:

o    they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements;

o    that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case;

o    that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college

·          The RTC dismissed the case. However, the UPCM Faculty denied the appeal of the students because they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM.

·          As a result, the students filed with the RTC a MR its order of dismissal. The RTC ordered the admission of the students.

·          The BOR (1031st meeting) resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them

·          UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. The UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct and  issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension against the Dean and Secretary.

Issue: WON the Med Faculty can enforce the cut-off that they set without the approval of University Council. NO.

Ratio:

·          The powers vested in the ff

o    BOR:  governance and the general powers of administration of the university [UP Charter (Act No. 1870)]

o    University Council: the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university (sec. 9). [UP Charter (Act No. 1870)]

o    College Faculty:  the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the approval of the autonomous UC. [University Code, Title II, Chapter 43, Article 324]

·          Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UC's approval.

·          The fact that the students knew of the 90 percentile NMAT cut-off score would not cure this defect. It follows then that the previously approved NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile remains the prescribed passing grade.

·          When the BOR retained the cut off score it did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to the UPCM.

·          The UPCM cannot invoke that it was given the authority to decide by the UC. What was actually approved in said meeting of the College of Medicine Faculty are: "NMAT has replaced CMET" and "It was moved by Dr. Talusan and seconded by Dr. Reodica that 70% be the cut off point of NMAT for all categories. The motion was carried without any objection.

·          The clause "as prescribed by the College of Medicine faculty" cannot be interpreted as a delegation of authority to prescribe the written test(s) of achievement without the approval of the University Council. The clause is worded in the past tense and can only refer to an accomplished act of the faculty.

·          Petitioners also invoke that the students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to admission based on the letter that they sent

·          SC: The student's aforesaid feeling does not amount to a categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Its predicated more on an overwhelming sense of hopelessness because of the antagonistic treatment of the faculty towards the students.

·          The faculty cannot invoke academic freedom because the under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the University Council.

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