doctrine
In cases where the property is transferred by the defendant during the pendency of the litigation,
the interest of the transferee pendente lite cannot be considered independent of the interest of his transferors.
If the transferee files an answer while the transferor is declared in default,
the case should be tried on the basis of the transferee’s answer and with the
participation of the transferee.
facts
·
Flaviana De Gracia owns a 463-sq m of
land. When Flaviana died intestate in 1980,
leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo and Elena Martin-Alvarado as her
compulsory heirs.
·
Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of a
private document[1] waived all their hereditary rights to
Flaviana’s land in favor of Francisca Medrano in consideration of the
expenses that she incurred for Flaviana’s medication, hospitalization and
burial.
·
Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar
renunciation, Medrano filed a Complaint for quieting of title and/or partition
with damages against Pelagia, Faustina, Jesus, Veneranda, Emilio a.k.a. Antonio
Alvarado, Francisca and Estrellita before the RTC.
·
De Vera filed an Answer with
Counterclaim, presented himself as the real party-in-interest.
o
the private document executed by the defendants’ predecessors in favor of
Medrano was null and void for want of consideration.
o
some children renounced their hereditary rights in favor of De Vera.
·
Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with
Counterclaim of De Vera and to Declare Defendants in Default.
She argued that De Vera had no personality to answer the complaint since
he was not authorized by the named defendants to answer in their behalf.
·
The trial court did not allow De Vera
to present his evidence. TC ruled that he should have complied with the court’s
order to file a pleading-in-intervention.
·
CA agreed with De Vera.
o
trial court should ordered the
substitution of the original defendants instead of requiring De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention. (Rule 3, Section 19)
o
A transferee pendente
lite is a proper party to the case, the court can order his outright
substitution for the original defendants.
the lost trial court
·
TC disagreed with Medrano’s argument and admitted
De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. The TC opined that De Vera did not need a
special power of attorney from the defendants because he did not answer the
complaint in their behalf.
·
De Vera
made a voluntary appearance in the case as the transferee of the defendants’
rights to the subject property. The TC further explained that when the presence of
other parties is required for granting complete relief, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants.
·
While it was unsure whether De Vera was an
indispensable party to the case, the TC opined that at the very least he was a necessary party for granting complete relief.
·
The admission of De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim
is proper in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.
·
The court declared the named defendants in default for not answering the complaint despite
valid service of summons. Thus, it appears that the court a quo treated the named defendants and De
Vera as distinct and separate parties.
medrano
·
With regard to the order declaring the named
defendants in default, Medrano filed on Feb 13, 2003 a Motion to Set Reception
of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of Court.
·
She argued that she could present evidence ex parte
against the defaulting defendants on the ground that she presented alternative
causes of action against them in her complaint.
·
Her cause of action on the basis of acquisitive
prescription can be raised solely against the defaulting original defendants.
·
She prayed to be allowed to present evidence ex
parte with respect to her claim of acquisitive prescription against the
defaulting defendants.
·
As for the order admitting De Vera’s Answer with
Counterclaim, Medrano filed on a MR and asked the court to order De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could
be properly named as a defendant in the case.
·
TC resolved to grant Medrano’s Motion to Set
Reception of Evidence. It ordered the conduct of ex parte presentation of
evidence. Medrano presented her evidence ex parte on the set dates. The case
was submitted for resolution.
·
TC resolved pets’ and De Vera’s respective pending
motions. TC granted Medrano’s set aside its Order which admitted De Vera’s Answer
with Counterclaim. Citing Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the court ordered De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention so that he could be recognized as a
party-defendant. As a necessary consequence to this ruling, the TC denied De
Vera’s motion to set the case for preliminary conference for prematurity.
Ruling of the RTC
·
ownership over the titled property has vested in
Heirs of Medrano by virtue of good faith possession
for more than 10 years;
·
it was no longer necessary to compel the defendants
- heirs of Hilaria and Elena - to execute an instrument to confirm Medrano’s
rightful ownership over the land.
·
"Tapno
Maamoan Ti Sangalobongan" sufficiently conveyed to Medrano the property. The
conveyance was done in consideration of
the various expenses that Medrano incurred for Flaviana’s benefit.
mr at the rtc
He was an indispensable party
who was not given an opportunity to
present his evidence in the case.
Medrano was not the owner of the property, but a mere administratrix of the land.
decision for the mr
·
De Vera had no legal personality to file a MR
because he did not file a pleading-in-intervention.
·
It would have allowed De Vera to present his
evidence in the case had he complied with the court’s order to file a
pleading-in-intervention.
Pet: De Vera, as a transferee pendente lite, was bound by the final judgment
or decree rendered against his transferors. Even assuming that De Vera had a
right to appeal, the period therefor had already lapsed on August 12, 2003.
RTC: De Vera was not a party to the suit, hence his appeal would not
stay the finality and execution of judgment. The writ of execution was issued
on Dec 12, 2003.
de vera arguments
·
De Vera insisted that he stepped into the shoes of
the defendants with regard to the property by virtue of the quitclaim that the defendants executed in
his favor. TC should have considered the defendants as properly substituted
by De Vera when he filed his Answer.
·
De Vera argued that it was improper for the TC to
have allowed Medrano to present her evidence ex parte because it had yet to
rule on whether De Vera had personality to participate in the proceedings.
Ruling of the CA
·
CA agreed with De Vera.
·
The ex parte presentation of evidence took place on
March 6 and 10, 2003; while the Motion to Expunge Answer and Require Filing of
Pleading-in-Intervention was granted much later on March 31, 2003.
·
TC gravely abused its discretion by allowing
Medrano to present her evidence ex parte while De Vera’s personality to participate in the case still remained
unresolved. The premature ex parte presentation of evidence rendered a
pleading-in-intervention moot and academic.
·
TC should have exercised its authority to order the
substitution of the original defendants instead of requiring De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention.
·
De Vera’s failure to file the
pleading-in-intervention was a technical
defect that could have been easily cured.
·
CA remanded the case to the TC to afford De Vera an
opportunity to present his evidence.
Issues
Whether De Vera is bound by the judgment against his transferors
Whether it was proper for the CA to take cognizance of resp’s Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus
Our Ruling
Whether De Vera could participate without filing a motion to intervene
·
TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow
De Vera to participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to
intervene.
·
TC held that De Vera’s right to participate in the
case was independent of the named
defendants. Because of its ruling that De Vera had an "independent
interest," the TC considered his interest as separate from Medrano’s
claims against the named defendants, and allowed the latter to be tried
separately.
·
De Vera’s interest is not independent of or severable from the interest of the named
defendants. De Vera is a transferee
pendente lite of the named defendants. His rights were derived
from the named defendants and he would be bound by any judgment against his
transferors under the rules of res judicata.
·
What the TC should have done is to treat De Vera
(as transferee pendente lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant, and
to try the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s
participation.
·
Rule 3.19 gives the TC discretion to allow or
disallow the substitution or joinder by the transferee. Discretion is permitted
because, in general, the transferee’s
interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the
participation of his transferors in the case. In legal contemplation, he is not really denied protection as
his interest is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties to
the case.
·
The TC should have tried the case based on De
Vera’s answer, which answer is deemed to have been adopted by the non-answering
defendants.
·
Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of
the transferee is "upon motion", and De Vera did not file any motion
for substitution or joinder. However, this technical flaw may be disregarded
for the fact remains that the court had
already admitted his answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte
presentation of evidence was allowed by the court.
·
The purpose
of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order
for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting
claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due
process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate in the
case and he will not be bound by the judgment.
·
De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a
transferee pendente lite. As mentioned, a
transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment
when the transfer of interest is perfected.
·
De Vera’s failure to file a
pleading-in-intervention will not change the long foregone violation of his
right to due process. The ex parte
presentation of evidence had already been terminated when the TC required De
Vera to file his pleading-in-intervention.
·
The TC’s judgment by default cannot bind De Vera. A
void judgment cannot attain finality and its execution has no basis in law.
Case should be remanded to the TC for trial based on De Vera’s answer and with
his participation.
Certiorari petition before the CA proper
Ordinary appeal was not an adequate remedy under the circumstances of
the case. An appeal seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by a court, which has jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter of the dispute. TC maintained that it had no jurisdiction over De Vera because it
did not consider him a party to the case. An appeal would have been an illusory
remedy in this situation because his notice of appeal would have certainly been
denied on the ground that he is not a party to the case.
Certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Given the
circumstance that the final decision prejudices De Vera’s rights despite the
fact that he was not recognized as a party thereto and was not allowed to
assail any portion thereof, De Vera’s
remedy was to annul the TC proceedings on the ground that it was conducted with
GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction. With such annulment, the TC should
hear the case anew with De Vera fully participating therein.
CA affirmed.
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