NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI
Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the controversy.
FACTS
On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for
the condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This is for
construction of a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac,"
Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had caused to be made a
thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where
the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a
result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were
located in Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff,
pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the
lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in
operation.
On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct.
9, a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated
in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged
in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial
court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff.
ISSUES/RULING
WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take
cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another province
YES, Sections 55 and 56[1] of
Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction
upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no
suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly
sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of
an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate
located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time
be assigned.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it
simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To
be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise
it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses
jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose
jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of
the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the
legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over
the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection,
on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the
person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or
it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has
attached.
WON Sec. 377[2] of
the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258[3]
are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
NO, the terms of section 377 providing that actions affecting real
property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit,
or some part thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of CFI over
the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the
place of trial.
That it had jurisdiction of
the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained
not only by the usual course of practice - that is, by the process of the court
- but also by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted
itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. The defendants are now in
this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not
only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on
this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them.
Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty
of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not
lie in Tarlac as it now asserts.
DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE
The question of venue does not relate to jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter, it simply granting to the defendant certain
rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the place of trial,
which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by implication.
Venue becomes merely a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the
Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province
of Ilocos Norte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should not be
followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the control of either
party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in
accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a
result, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the
consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action
tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose
lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant,
his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such
case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting
defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province
or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the
decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not
objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that
that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove
it.
Disposition
The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial
court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.
Supporting american jurisprudence
First
National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141):
The exemption of national banks from
suits in State courts in counties other than the county in which the
association was located was a personal
privilege which could be waived.
This exemption of national banking
associations from suits in State courts, (aside from principal office)
wasprescribed for the convenience of
those institutions. However, the defendant did notchoose to claim immunity from
suit in that court. It made defense upon
the merits, and, having been unsuccessful, and in the latter tribunal, for the
first time, claimed the immunity granted to it by Congress.
Ex
parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369):
The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be
sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is
rather in the nature of a personal
exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive. Here,
the defendant companies have provided that they can be found in a district
other than that in which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is
adopted, and they have been so found.
St.
Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride (141 U.S., 127):
The right to insist upon suit only in
the one district is a personal privilege which he may waive, and he does waive
it by pleading to the merits.
Chouteau
vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290):
Though the suit was brought in the
county in which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon the defendant in
the county of his residence, unless a
plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant, was interposed in the first instance, the objection on the score of
lack of jurisdiction could not subsequently be successfully raised.
It is not meant to convey the idea
that the mere failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court would have the
effect to confer jurisdiction where none existed before; for it is well settled
that even consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction. But all circuit courts
have a general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.
De
La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas, 205):
Every district court in the State has
cognizance of such suits; the requirement as to the county in which the suit
may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may
be waived like any other privilege of this character.
Supporting spanish jurisprudence
He who by his own acts submits himself
to the jurisdiction of a court shall not thereafter be permitted to question
such jurisdiction. (Judgment of December 30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)
According to article 305 (of the Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Civil) the plaintiff shall be presumed to have tacitly
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the mere act of filing his complaint therein, and in the case of the
defendant where the latter after appearing in the action takes any step therein other than to object to such jurisdiction.
(Judgment of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur., 232.)
In order that a tacit submission based
upon the mere act filing the complaint may be valid the court must be one of
ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento
Civil. (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)
Supporting english jurisprudence
The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England
(vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local'
and 'transitory' actions, though of far less importance than it was before the
passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in mind in connection with
actions relating to land situate outside the local jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions were those in which
the facts in issue between the parties had no necessary connection with a
particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst "local" actions were those in which there was such a
connection, e.g., disputes as to the title to, or trespasses to, land.
In the case of local actions the
plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in
the actual hundred) in which the land in question lay. In the case, however of
a transitory action, he might lay it wherever he pleased, subject to the power
of the court to alter it in a proper case. Local
venues have now been abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions relating to
land in England are concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from another
point of view, viz, that of jurisdiction
as distinct from procedure. In the case of real actions relating to land in
the colonies or foreign countries the English courts had, even before the
judicature acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the removal by those acts of
a difficulty of procedure viz, the rule as to local venue which might have
stood in the way, if they had and wished to exercise jurisdiction, did not in
any way confer jurisdiction in such cases.
The lack of jurisdiction still exists,
and our courts refuse to adjudicate upon claims of title to foreign land in
proceedings founded on an alleged invasion of the proprietary rights attached
thereto, and to award damages founded on that adjudication; in other words, an action for trespass to, or for
recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained in England, at any rate if the
defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership of such land.
existing ph jurisprudence not
applicable
The matter before the court was the
jurisdiction of the CFI over the actions and proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of deceased
persons. The determination of that question required the consideration of section 602 of the code of Civil Procedure
rather than section 377. The argument of the court touching the last-named
section, is inapplicable. #peaches
Molina
vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12)
The issue was WON an agreement between
parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court to the
exclusion of the court provided by law as the appropriate court in the premises
could be enforced.
The court was not discussing or
deciding the question WON an action could be maintained in the CFI Manila to
foreclose a mortgage on real estate located in Albay; but, rather, whether or not an action could be
maintained in the CFI of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on personal
property located in the Province of Albay. The remark of the court that
perhaps the former action could not be maintained was not intended to be
decisive and was not thought at the time to be an indication of what the
decision of the court might be if that precise case were presented to it with
full argument and citation of authorities.
Jurisdiction
of the CFI to issue a writ of prohibition against a justice of the peace
holding his court outside the province in which the CFI was sitting at the time
of issuing the writ. The determination of the question presented different
considerations and different provisions of law from those which rule the
decision of the case at bar.
Special laws relating to the
condemnation of land by railroad companies
Act No. 1258, SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized
by law, to exercise the power of eminent domain and has not obtained by
agreement with the owners thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as
authorized by law, it may in its complaintshall be instituted in the CFI of the
province where the lands is situated.
These
special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an intention of the
legislature to alter the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of CFIs granted
by Act No. 136. As we said in discussing the provisions of section 377
of theCode of Civil Procedure, we can not hold that jurisdiction to be
limited unless by express provision or clear intendment.
We
have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the code of Civil
Procedure and section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither the one nor the other was
intended to restrict, much less deprive, the CFIs of the jurisdiction over
lands in the Philippine Islands conferred upon them by Act No. 136.
[1]SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall
be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate.
SEC.
56. Its original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:
2. In all civil actions which involve the title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of
any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act
conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
[2]SEC. 377. Venue of actions.
Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real
estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or
to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real
estate, or to establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions
for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the
province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated; actions against
executors, administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their
official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and actions
for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and
distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the
province in which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of
administration were granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all actions not
herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the
defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any
province where the plaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is
made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides
within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain
title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action
is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the
Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the
property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated
or is found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal,
but is by publication, in accordance with law, the action must be brought in
the province where the land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the
court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in
any province to bring in defendants peaches and to enforce all orders and decrees of
the court. Thefailure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at
the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on
his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is
brought, except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this
section relating to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators,
and guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.
[3]Special law covering rail roads
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