doctrine
“Filing the appropriate initiatory
pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari
facts
Flordelis B. Menzon, Regional Director
of the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the intervention of
Judge Sinforiano A. Monsanto of the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged
anomalous auction sale conducted by Sheriff De Guzman.
According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman
previously acceded to its request to move the date of the auction sale to
January 20, 2004; however, to its surprise, the sale proceeded as originally
scheduled on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid
of Leoncio Lim in the amount of P500K was grossly disadvantageous to the
government considering that the outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor,
Eduardo Monsanto (Eduardo), was more than the bid amount
Judge Monsanto refrained from acting
on the letter considering that Eduardo is his relative; instead he re-assigned
the same to Judge Sibanah E. Usman.
Judge Usman declared that Atty. Cesar
Lee argued on behalf of Pag-IBIG; and that Pascual Monsanto appeared on behalf
of Eduardo. However, Judge Usman noted that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed which presents a
judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of partake of
administrative matter. Consequently, Judge Usman referred the matter to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for further action.
Pascual filed with the OCAa Motion
to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate. Pascual alleged that
De Guzmanissued a Notice to Vacate; that the same is being enforced with grave
threats and harassment; that the protest of Pag-IBIG remains pending with and
unresolved by OCA; that the trial court did not transmit the records of the
case to the OCA; that the winning bid of P500K submitted by Leoncio is
disadvantangeous to the government; that Eduardo’s loan with Pag-IBIG is being
proposed for restructuring; and that the writ of execution and notice to vacate
would gravely prejudice their rights. Pascual thus prayed that:
·
An
order be issued lifting the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate;
·
An
order be issued enjoining or restraining the subject Sheriff from enforcing the
said Notice to vacate; and
·
Court
officials or personnel above mentioned be made to explain respecting the
handling of the case
OCA directed Judge Usman to:
(1)
conduct an investigation on the missing records of ‘Home Development
Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG) vs. Eduardo Monsanto’ and to report thereon within
THIRTY (30) days from notice; and
(2)
take action on (a) Items A and B of the ‘Motion to Lift Writ of
Execution and Notice to Vacate’ and (b) the letter of Home Development Mutual
Fund dated 18 February 2004, a copy of which is annexed to the ‘Motion to Lift
Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate’, herewith attached.
Judge Usman notified Pag-IBIG,
Eduardo, and Leoncio of a hearing scheduled on June 14, 2005.14
This time, the case was captioned as “Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG
Fund), mortgagee, v. Eduardo Monsanto, mortgagor.”
Pag-IBIG informed the trial court that
the loan of Eduardo had been restructured and that Eduardo had commenced paying
monthly amortizations; that as a result of the restructuring, Pag-IBIG is
withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure; and that it is no
longer interested in pursuing an administrative action against De Guzman.
Leoncio opposed Pag-IBIG’s
manifestation.Leoncio filed with Branch 27 a Manifestation withEx-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming that the
reglementary period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming the subject property;
as such, he is already entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession.
On July 15, 2005, Decoroso D. Monsanto
and Pascual moved to intervene in the case.Both claimed that they are co-owners
and actual possessors of the subject property.
Ruling
of the RTC – Branch 28
The public auction sale are in
order. The impugned Sheriff De Guzman had accordingly performed his
functions. There is no showing that he has abuse[d] his authority during
the conduct of the public auction.
Atty. Cesar E. Lee prayed that an
order be issued directing de Guzmanto make the necessary notice to all
concern[ed] of the fact that the mortgagee has restructured his loan with the
mortgagor, and in effect, redeemed his obligation subject matter of this
foreclosure proceeding.
De Guzman explained that even assuming
that there was restructuring of the [mortgage] loan it is very clear that it
was done after the lapse of the one
(1) year redemption period and also there was no notice given to the
Office of the Clerk of Court.
Eduardo, Pascual, and Pag-IBIG filed
MRs; however, the same were denied by the trial court in its August 30, 2005
Order.
Ruling
of the CA
No GAD on the part of the RTC and
affirming its July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005 Orders.
Petitioners’ Arguments
·
Pettionersargue that the ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession should be under oath, and requires prior notice and hearing;
·
The mere filing of the sheriff’s certificate of sale with the Register
of Deeds is not equivalent to registration as required in order for the
one-year redemption period to commence;
·
PDNo. 1529 did not repeal Act No. 3135;
·
that the occupants of the subject property hold rights adverse to the
mortgagor Eduardo; and that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was
attended by numerous irregularities.
Respondent Lim’s Arguments
·
Mere filing of the sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with the Samar Register
of Deeds on March 5, 2004 was equivalent to the registration thereof;
·
Samar Registrar of Deeds assured him that mere receipt of the
Certificate of Sale is tantamount to registration; he relied upon this
representation and assurance in good faith; and that petitioners’ remedy is to
file a separate case for recovery of ownership and possession.
issues/Ruling
The Petition is dismissed.
“Filing the appropriate initiatory
pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court specifically provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing
of the original complaint in court.” Moreover, “[e]very ordinary civil
action must be based on a cause of action.”
No
proper initiatory pleading was filed before the trial court.
No formal complaint or petition was
filed in court. The case was “commenced” through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive Judge
Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman.
Letter could not in any way be
considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines
pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.”
Pag-IBIG’s letter could not be
considered as a formal complaint or petition”
·
the parties to the case were not identified pursuant to Section 1,Rule 3
and Section 1,Rule 7.
·
so-called claim or cause of action was not properly mentioned or
specified.
·
letter miserably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules
of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not even assigned a docket
number; the parties were not properly identified; the allegations were not
properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact, only the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested;
·
it was not signed by a counsel; and
·
most of all, there is no verification or certification against
forum-shopping.
Judge Usman of Branch 28 resolved the
following incidents: (1) the motion for issuance of writ of possession filed by
Leoncio; and (2) the motion to lift writ of execution and notice to
vacate.
However, the said Manifestation
with Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was not even
filed before Branch 28; in fact, it was submitted for consideration of Branch
27. Moreover, the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate
was filed by Pascual before the OCA; the RTC Branches 27 and 28 of Catbalogan,
Samar, were only furnished copies thereof.
Judge Usman proceeded to take
cognizance of the case notwithstanding his prior observation that no formal
petition or complaint was actually filed and which presents a judicial
issue.
Judge Usman opined that the acts
complained of partake of administrative matter and thus referred the same to
the OCA for further action.
The letter of OCA directing Judge
Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice
to Vacate could not be interpreted as vesting Judge Usman with the
authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter.
No
payment of docket fees.
No docket fees were paid before the
trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that
“[u]pon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in
full.” “It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.”
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v.
Shemberg Marketing Corporation:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a
case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of
filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as
to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous
losses to government in general and to the judiciary in particular.
RTC Branch 28 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the matter/case. All the proceedings undertaken by the
trial court are null and void, and without force and effect.
Petition denied.
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